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Asymmetric Information and Conglomerate Discount: Evidence from Spinoffs 
 
 
Abstract 
The existing literature argues that diversified firms may be undervalued due to the information 
asymmetry between a firm’s management and the market. Splitting the firm’s divisions into multiple 
business components is thought to facilitate the market valuation of each component more accurately. We 
investigate the information hypothesis from corporate spinoffs from 1981 through 2004. We use the post-
spinoff data to reconstruct the diversified firm, assess the improvement in value at the combined firm 
level, and relate the value improvement to the change in the level of information asymmetry. We find that, 
prior to the spinoff, the sample firms have significantly higher levels of information asymmetry than their 
industry- and size-matched peers and that the level of information asymmetry decreases to a certain extent 
following the spinoff. We also find that the sample firms are valued at a substantial discount before the 
spinoff and that the valuation discount is eliminated after the completion of the spinoff. The matching 
firms, however, do not trade at a significant discount either pre- or post-spinoff. This is consistent with 
the view that only undervalued firms divest. More importantly, we find that the change in excess value 
around the spinoff is significantly and negatively related to the change in the level of information 
asymmetry. We conclude that information asymmetry is at least partly responsible for the diversification 
discount. 
 
 
Key words: asymmetric information; diversified firms; conglomerate discount; spinoff. 
JEL Classification: G14; G34 
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Asymmetric Information and Conglomerate Discount: Evidence from Spinoffs 
 
1. Introduction 
The substantive literature documents that diversified firms are valued at a discount relative to 
specialized firms in the same industries (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Servaes, 1996; 
Lins and Servaes, 1999, etc.). This value discount appears to exist in both the US and other countries and 
is fairly robust over time (Servaes, 1996; Lins and Servaes, 1999; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Lins and 
Servaes, 2002). Moreover, Comment and Jarrel (1995) document a trend toward corporate focus since the 
1980s.  John and Ofek (1995), Daley et al. (1997), Desai and Jain (1999), and Berger and Ofek (1999) 
report that focus-increasing divestitures such as asset sales, equity carve-outs, and corporate spinoffs lead 
to higher market valuations and stock returns. 
Researchers have provided various reasons to explain the discount of diversified firms and the 
sources of gains around divestitures. One stream of research (e.g. Nanda and Narayanan, 1999) explains 
the undervaluation of diversified firms and the divestiture decisions of these firms in terms of asymmetric 
information between the market and the firm’s management. This explanation draws theoretical support 
from Nanda and Narayanan (1999) who argue that diversified firms may be undervalued due to the 
unobservability of divisional cash flows to the market. Splitting the firm into separate business 
components will facilitate the market valuation of each component more accurately. Therefore, 
undervalued firms requiring external financing may find external equity capital too expensive and resort 
to divestitures to raise capital at a fair price. In the context of spinoffs in which no cash flow is generated, 
undervalued firms may first engage in spinoffs to get correctly valued and then approach the external 
capital market for funds (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999). If information asymmetry results in 
undervaluation of the diversified firm, we expect that 1) the pre-divestiture information asymmetry of the 
divesting firms should be higher compared to their non-divesting counterparts, 2) divestitures will reduce 
the level of information asymmetry and the valuation discount, and more importantly, 3) the change in 
firm value following the divestiture will be negatively related to the change in the level of information 
asymmetry.  
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The primary objective of this paper is to use corporate spinoffs to examine these predictions. 
Spinoffs facilitate the purpose of the test for two main reasons. Firstly, financial data are separately 
available for the post-spinoff parent firm and the spun-off unit. This allows us to combine the data of the 
parent and spunoff firms following the divestiture as if the firm were still a conglomerate and measure the 
changes in firm value and information asymmetry at the combined firm level. Secondly, changes in 
information asymmetry and firm value around spinoffs are well documented separately in the literature. 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find that, for firms that engage in spinoffs, information problems 
decrease significantly after the completion of spinoffs. Gilson et al. (2001) document significant 
improvements in the quantity and quality of analyst coverage for parent firms after focus-increasing stock 
breakups (spinoffs, equity carve-outs, and targeted stock offerings). Burch and Nanda (2003) and Ahn 
and Denis (2004) show that, on average, spinoffs achieve significant improvements in combined firm 
excess value. However, to the best of our knowledge, no prior studies have empirically examined the link 
between the change in asymmetric information and the change in firm value following spinoffs. This 
paper extends the literature by providing direct evidence on whether reductions in information asymmetry 
contribute to firm value improvements surrounding spinoffs.  
Our sample consists of 126 spinoff events announced by multi-segment firms between 1981 and 
2004. We gauge the benefit from the spinoff by measuring the change in combined firm excess value 
from the year prior to the announcement of the spinoff to the year following the completion of the spinoff. 
We employ three different proxies of information asymmetry: the analysts’ forecast error, the market-
adjusted residual standard deviation and the market-and-industry-adjusted residual standard deviation. We 
find that diversified firms that engage in spinoffs have significantly higher levels of information 
asymmetry than their industry- and size-matched counterparts prior to the spinoff. For firms that engage 
in spinoffs the level of information asymmetry decreases slightly after the completion of the spinoff while 
for their matching firms the level of information asymmetry increases slightly during the same period. We 
also find that the sample firms are valued at a substantial discount prior to the spinoff. Following the 
spinoff, the valuation discount is eliminated. The matching firms, however, do not trade at a significant 
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discount in the pre-spinoff period. Nor do they experience an increase in firm value from the pre-spinoff 
to the post-spinoff period.  
Using multivariate analysis and controlling for various factors, such as the pre-spinoff firm excess 
value, the change in total diversification, etc., we find that the change in excess value is significantly 
negatively related to the change in asymmetric information surrounding the spinoff. The results are robust 
to each proxy of asymmetric information and the inclusion of various definitions of control variables. We 
conclude that the diversification discount at least partially reflects a value loss due to information 
asymmetry.  
For completeness, we also examine the three-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the 
announcement of spinoffs. As in previous studies, we document significant announcement period 
abnormal returns. However, we do not find a significant link between the announcement period abnormal 
returns and the level of information asymmetry prior to the spinoff or the change in the level of 
information asymmetry surrounding the spinoff. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related research and develops 
the hypothesis to be tested. Section 3 presents measures of firm excess value and information asymmetry. 
Section 4 describes the sample selection procedure and provides descriptive statistics for the sample. The 
empirical analysis is contained in section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
There is a vast and well-developed literature on the discount of diversified firms and on the 
sources of value gains around spinoffs. This diversification discount has two broad and non-mutually 
exclusive explanations. The first explanation says that diversification itself somehow destroys firm value. 
The negative impact of diversification is often described in terms of inefficient investment (Berger and 
Ofek, 1995; Lamont, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000; Lamont and Polk, 2002; Dittmar and 
Shivdasani, 2003; Ahn and Denis, 2004) and exacerbated agency problems (Denis et al., 1997) within 
diversified firms. The second argues that diversification does not destroy value and the discount is an 
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artifact of the endogeneity of the diversification decision (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Graham et al., 2002; 
Hyland and Diltz, 2002), measurement errors (Chevalier, 2000; Whited, 2001) or selection bias 
(Villalonga, 2004). A variety of reasons has also been presented in the literature to explain the value gains 
to spinoffs. Among the most popular are improvements in corporate focus (Daley et al., 1997; Desai and 
Jain, 1999), improvements in management incentives (Schipper and Smith, 1983), increase in investment 
efficiency (Ahn and Denis, 2004), relaxation of regulatory or tax constraints (Schipper and Smith, 1983), 
facilitation of a merger or takeover (Cusatis et al., 1993), and elimination of cross subsidies, etc.  
A growing literature provides an alternative explanation for the diversification discount and the 
gains to spinoffs based upon information asymmetries between inside managers and outside investors. 
Managers normally have an advantage over outside investors in predicting firm-specific events. This 
creates an informational gap between insiders of the firm and outsiders. The size of the information gap is 
likely to differ between diversified and focused firms. Diversified firms may be harder to value than 
focused firms if the accounting figures for diversified firms are less informative due to the aggregate 
nature of diversified firms’ accounting reports (Hadlock et al., 2001). Using samples of spinoffs or stock 
breakups, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and Gilson et al. (2001) report empirical evidence 
consistent with this notion. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find that, for firms that engage in 
spinoffs, information problems decrease significantly after the completion of spinoffs. These firms also 
raise more capital following spinoffs. Gilson et al. (2001) document significant improvements in the 
quantity and quality of analyst coverage for parent firms after focus-increasing stock breakups (spinoffs, 
equity carve-outs, and targeted stock offerings). These improvements seem to stem from the enhanced 
ability of industry specialists to utilize their expertise in forecasting the performance of pure plays.  
Dunn and Nathan (1998) report lower analysts’ forecast accuracy and higher inter-analyst 
disagreement as a company’s unrelated diversification increases. In contrast to the above reasoning, 
Hadlock et al. (2001) develop an argument that diversification may alleviate asymmetric information 
problems based on the assumption that the errors outsiders make in valuing segment cash flows are not 
perfectly correlated with each other, which implies that the absolute value of the percentage error in the 
 7
estimation of firm cash flows may be smaller for a diversified firm than for a focused firm. Consistent 
with this argument, they document a less negative market reaction to equity-issue announcements for 
diversified firms than for focused ones. Using information proxies derived from analysts’ forecasts and 
abnormal returns associated with earnings announcements, Thomas (2002) finds that greater 
diversification is not associated with increased asymmetric information. In a similar vein, Clarke et al. 
(2004) show that diversified firms are not associated with greater asymmetric information than focused 
firms based on metrics drawn from the market microstructure literature. These results call into question 
the notion that corporate diversification would exacerbate information problems and result in a valuation 
discount.  
The above empirical studies, however, only focus on the relation between corporate 
diversification and asymmetric information. Missing from the debate is a direct link between asymmetric 
information and firm value. Nanda and Narayanan (1999) develop an information-based model to explain 
the undervaluation of multi-divisional firms and divestiture decisions of these firms. They introduce a 
cost to diversification based on asymmetric information between the market and the management. They 
assume that only management can observe the divisional cash flows of the firm. The market can observe 
only the firm’s aggregate cash flows and not the divisional cash flows. Therefore, management will 
correctly place a greater weight on the more informative division’s cash flows in updating its quality than 
they would on the remaining division’s cash flows. The market, however, can only observe the aggregate 
cash flows and therefore rationally updates the overall quality of the firm as if each division were 
performing at an average level. In the scenario where the division with more informative cash flows 
performs well (poorly), the market will undervalue (overvalue) the successful division and overvalue 
(undervalue) the poorly performing division, leading to undervaluation (overvaluation) of the firm. 
Breaking up the firm into separate businesses will make it easier for the market to value it correctly. 
Therefore, undervalued firms requiring external financing may resort to divestitures to raise capital at a 
fair price while overvalued firms will resort to equity issues without separating its divisions. In the 
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context of spinoffs in which no cash flow is generated, undervalued firms may first engage in spinoffs to 
get correctly valued and then approach the external capital market for funds.  
Empirical work that directly relates the measures of information asymmetry to the value of the 
firm is sparse. Using two-stage least squares regression models to reduce the endogeneity problem 
between the diversification discount and information asymmetry, Kim et al. (2002) find that firms with 
larger information asymmetry have significantly lower firm value. Best et al. (2004) empirically examine 
the relation between the diversification discount and the level of information asymmetry for multi-
segment and single-segment firms. They find that the diversification discount is significantly and 
positively related to information asymmetry, but a significant diversification discount still exists after 
controlling for differences in information asymmetry and other firm characteristics between diversified 
and nondiversified firms. Therefore, they conclude that the diversification discount cannot be explained 
by information asymmetry. If the discount of diversified firms is caused in part by information 
asymmetries between the market and the firm’s management, and undervalued firms undertake 
divestitures to get a fair valuation as predicted by Nanda and Narayanan (1999)’s model, we expect the 
following hypotheses to hold.  
Hypothesis 1.  The pre-divestiture information asymmetry of the divesting firms should be higher 
compared to their non-divesting counterparts.  
Hypothesis 2. Divestitures will reduce the level of information asymmetry and the diversification 
discount. 
Hypothesis 3. Controlling for other factors, the increase in firm value following divestitures will 
be negatively related to the change in the level of information asymmetry.  
 
3. Empirical design 
Our empirical approach is to analyze the change in firm excess value and the degree of 
information asymmetry following the breakup of a conglomerate and to examine whether the change in 
information asymmetry is associated with the change in firm excess value. The primary advantage of this 
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approach is that it does not rely on cross-sectional comparisons of the firm value and the level of 
information asymmetry across diversified and focused firms. Hence, it avoids the omitted variables 
problem that typically confounds inferences from this research (Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003). 
Specifically, we use a sample of corporate spinoffs. Spinoffs facilitate the study of the valuation effects of 
information asymmetry for two main reasons. Firstly, changes in firm value and the level of information 
asymmetry around spinoffs are well documented in the literature (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; 
Gilson et al., 2001; Burch and Nanda, 2003; Ahn and Denis, 2004). Secondly, financial data are 
separately available for the surviving parent firm and the spunoff unit following the spinoff. This allows 
us to combine the post-spinoff data of the parent firm and the spunoff unit as if the spinoff had not 
occurred and to measure the benefit from the spinoff by examining changes in the combined firm’s excess 
value and relate this benefit to changes in the combined firm’s level of information asymmetry. Given this 
experimental design, it is difficult to attribute the diversification discount to just measurement error or 
selection bias. If there is a measurement error, it will be present in both the pre- and post-spinoff excess 
values and is unlikely to drive the change between the two. The selection bias is also unlikely to explain 
the results as all units included in measuring the pre-spinoff excess value are also included in gauging the 
post-spinoff excess value. Admittedly, since we use a specific sample of restructured firms, our findings 
may not be generalized to the entire population of diversified firms.  
This paper is closely linked to Burch and Nanda (2003) and Ahn and Denis (2004). Burch and 
Nanda (2003) document that improvements in combined firm excess value following spinoffs are 
significantly associated with reductions in diversity in investment opportunities. Ahn and Denis (2004) 
find that increases in investment efficiency around spinoffs lead to corresponding increases in combined 
firm excess value. This study extends these two papers by providing direct evidence on another potential 
source of value creation around spinoffs. Although we do not explicitly examine changes in investment 
efficiency as in Burch and Nanda (2003) and Ahn and Denis (2004), our paper has implications for these 
studies because higher levels of information asymmetry makes it more difficult for investors to assess the 
efficiency of investment of the firm and hence may lead to lower firm values.  
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3.1. Measuring firm excess value 
We measure the valuation effect of diversification using the excess value measure originally 
developed by Berger and Ofek (1995). Excess value is computed as the log of the ratio of a firm’s value 
of total capital to the sum of the imputed value of its segments as stand-alone firms. Total capital is 
defined as the book value of debt plus the market value of common equity. Imputed values are calculated 
as the sales-weighted sum of the median ratio of total capital to sales for single segment firms in the same 
industry. Industry median ratios are based on the three-digit SIC level provided that there are at least five 
single-segment firms in the industry. If fewer than five single-segment firms match at the three-digit SIC 
level, the two digit-SIC level is examined and so on until the median ratio of the tightest SIC level with at 
least five observations is found. In cases where the sum of a firm’s segment sales figures from the 
Compustat Business Segment Information database deviates from its total sales figures from the 
Compustat Industrial Annual database, the firm’s imputed value is grossed up or down by the percentage 
deviation between the sum of segment sales and total sales. Specifically, the pre-spinoff excess value of 
the firm is defined as1  
( )⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
=
∑
=
n
i
ii
pre
SalesVIndSales
VLNEV
1
)/(*
    (1) 
where V equals a firm’s total capital, defined as the book value of debt plus the market value of common 
equity, iSales equals segment i’s value of sales, )/( SalesVIndi is the ratio of total capital to sales for the 
median single-segment firm in segment i’s industry.  
Following Burch and Nanda (2003), we compute the post-spinoff excess value using the 
combined values of the remaining parent firm and the spunoff unit. The post-spinoff excess value of the 
combined firm is defined as  
                                                 
1 Following Berger and Ofek (1995), we define extreme excess values as those for which the firm’s actual values are either more 
than four times imputed, or less than one-fourth imputed. Only four observations in our sample produce extreme pre- and post-
spinoff excess values. Whether excluding these four observations or not does not alter the main results. Hence, we keep them in 
our sample.  
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where PV (SV) is the total capital of the remaining parent firm (the spunoff unit) following the spinoff. 
i=1 to m represents the segments in the remaining parent firm and j=1 to k represents the segments in the 
spunoff unit. For this and other metrics in the study, pre-spinoff values are measured at the latest fiscal 
year-end prior to the spinoff announcement date. Post-spinoff values are measured at the end of the first 
full fiscal year following the spinoff effective date. The change in the combined firm’s excess value is 
defined as 
prepost EVCEVEV −=Δ      (3) 
 
3.2. Measuring information asymmetry 
We use three different measures of information asymmetry in the empirical analysis. Following 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and Thomas (2002), we use the forecast error in earnings as the 
first proxy of information asymmetry. This proxy is based on forecasts made within one year before 
actual earnings are released. 2  Similar to Thomas (2002), the pre-spinoff forecast error of the 
firm )( preERR  is defined as the absolute difference between actual earnings and the median forecasted 
earnings deflated by the stock price five days before the earnings announcement date.  
PRICE
FOREEARNACTEARN
ERR medpre
−=      (4) 
Following the spinoff, we compute the forecast error of the combined firm )( postCERR  as the 
absolute value of the weighted average of the signed forecast errors of the remaining parent firm and the 
spunoff unit, where the weights are the assets of the parent firm or the spunoff unit relative to the sum of 
                                                 
2 Elton et al. (1984) show that the errors in forecasts made very near the end of a forecasting period consists primarily of firm-
specific factors rather than economy- or industry-wide factors. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) use forecasts made in the 
last month of the fiscal year while Thomas (2002) uses forecasts made in the month before actual earnings are released. However, 
many observations will be lost if only near end forecasts are used. Hence, we use forecasts made within one year before actual 
earnings are released.  
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assets of the parent firm and the spunoff unit computed at the end of the first full fiscal year following the 
spinoff.  
spunoffspunoffparentparentpost ERRwERRwCERR ** +=    (5) 
Here, parentw )( spunoffw is the ratio of book value of assets of the parent firm (the spunoff unit) to 
the sum of book value of assets of the parent firm and the spunoff unit following the spinoff. 
parentERR )( spunoffERR  is the signed forecast error of the parent firm (spunoff unit) following the spinoff, 
where
parent
parentparent
parent PRICE
FOREEARNACTEARN
ERR
−=  and 
spunoff
spunoffspunoff
spunoff PRICE
FOREEARNACTEARN
ERR
−= . Since median forecast is used, we require that a 
firm must have at least three forecasts within the specified period. The change in the combined firm’s 
forecast error is defined as3  
prepost ERRCERRERR −=Δ . (6) 
In general, analysts’ forecast errors are expected to be larger when there is higher level of 
information asymmetry between managers and outsiders regarding firm earnings. Following Dierkens 
(1991) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), we use the market-adjusted residual standard 
deviation of daily stock returns as the second measure of information asymmetry. As pointed out by 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), this residual standard deviation variable captures the firm-
specific uncertainty born by outsiders after removing from the uncertainty common to the firm’s insiders 
and outsiders that is caused by market-wide factors influencing a firm’s value. Generally, firms with 
higher information asymmetry about their value are expected to have higher residual standard deviation in 
their returns. This measure is obtained by regressing daily firm returns on value-weighted market returns 
and calculating the standard deviation of the regression residuals. Specifically, we estimate the following 
regressions for each firm: 
                                                 
3 In multivariate regression analysis, we apply the square root transformation of this variable to improve the model fit. In 
regression analysis and simple correlation analysis, the variable ERRΔ  is measured as postCERR minus preERR . 
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where preptr is the daily return for the parent firm during the pre-spinoff period, 
post
wtr is the daily weighted 
average return of the remaining parent firm and the spunoff unit during the post-spinoff period, where the 
weights are the respective book value of total assets of the parent firm or the spunoff unit relative to the 
combined assets of the parent firm and the spunoff unit as of the end of the first full fiscal year following 
the spinoff, and mtr  is the daily return of the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index. Pre-spinoff 
refers to the 250-day period ending 50 days prior to the spinoff announcement date. Post-spinoff refers to 
the 250-day period starting 50 days after the spinoff effective date.  
We then obtain the market-adjusted standard deviation of the regression residuals for both the 
pre-spinoff and the post-spinoff period, MA
post )(εσ and MApre )(εσ . The change in the combined firm’s 
market-adjusted residual standard deviation is defined as  
MA
pre
MA
post
MA )()()( εσεσεσ −=Δ .    (8) 
The third measure of information asymmetry is the market-and-industry-adjusted residual 
standard deviation of daily stock returns. As pointed out by Dierkens (1991), the market-adjusted residual 
standard deviation may overestimate the true measure of information asymmetry since it may contain 
uncertainty about industry developments that is shared by managers and investors. We gauge the market-
and-industry-adjusted residual standard deviation by regressing daily firm returns on value-weighted 
market returns and industry returns and calculating the standard deviation of the regression residuals. 
Industry is defined as all firms (excluding all parent firms and spunoff units) that have the same 2-digit 
SIC code as the pre-spinoff parent firm.  
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where preptr is the daily return for the parent firm p in industry i during the pre-spinoff period and 
pre
tI is 
the daily value-weighted industry return for industry i.  The change in the combined firm’s market-and-
industry-adjusted residual standard deviation is defined as  
MIA
pre
MIA
post
MIA )()()( εσεσεσ −=Δ      (10) 
 
3.3. Control variables 
Most of the control variables are motivated by the prior diversification and spinoff literature as 
potential determinants of firm excess value and gains surrounding spinoffs. Cusatis et al. (1993) find that 
the post-spinoff abnormal performance of parents and spinoffs are confined to the subsample of firms that 
were acquired after the spinoff. We use an indicator variable to control for any valuation effect related to 
post-spinoff takeover activities. This takeover dummy )(TAKED  is set to 1 if either the parent firm or the 
spun-off unit was taken over or merged with other firms within three fiscal years following the spinoff. 
The variable is expected to be positively related to the change in excess value. 
Schipper and Smith (1983) find that relaxing regulatory constraints is a motive for some firms to 
engage in spinoffs. We use an indicator variable to control for regulatory benefits from a spinoff. The 
regulation dummy )(REGD  takes the value of 1 if either the parent or the subsidiary is in a regulated 
industry based on two-digit SIC code (SIC 4800-4829, 4910-4949). REGD  is expected to be positively 
related to the change in excess value.  
Daley et al. (1997) and Desai and Jain (1999) show that focus-increasing spinoffs result in higher 
stock market gains than non-focus-increasing spinoffs. Following Desai and Jain (1999), we use three 
alternative measures of increase in focus by including an indicator variable )(FOCUSD  for 1) whether 
the two-digit SIC code of the parent firm is different from that of the spunoff unit; 2) whether the parent 
firm’s reported number of segments at the two-digit SIC level decreases or not, and 3) whether the parent 
firm’s Herfindahl index measured at the two-digit SIC level decreases or not. The expected relation to the 
change in excess value is positive.  
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Hite and Owers (1983) and Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) find that announcement period gains are 
greater for large spinoffs than for small ones. We use the total assets of the divested unit measured 
relative to the sum of the assets of the parent and the divested unit computed at the end of the first full 
fiscal year following the spinoff to control for size related effects. We expect the coefficient of this 
variable )(SPINSIZE  to be positive.  
Burch and Nanda (2003) show that changes in the combined firm’s excess value are significantly 
greater for firms with negative pre-spinoff excess values than for firms with positive pre-spinoff excess 
values. This suggests that greater value improvements are realized where they are needed more, i.e., in 
firms that are trading at a discount (Burch and Nanda, 2003). Hence, we include preEV  as a control 
variable and expect it to be negatively related to the change in excess value.  
Burch and Nanda (2003) find that reductions in diversity lead to improvements in excess value. 
We control for changes in total diversification using the entropy measure from Jacquemin and Berry 
(1979). The entropy measure is calculated as: 
)/1(
1
i
n
i
i PLnPENTROPY ∑
=
=       (11) 
where iP  is the percentage of sales in segment i at the four–digit SIC level and the summation is over n 
four-digit industry segments where the firm operates. The entropy measure is calculated both prior to and 
following the spinoff, where the post-spinoff value is that of the combined firm. Larger values of 
ENTROPY correspond to less concentration of sales among segments and hence greater total 
diversification. Changes in combined firm’s entropy measure )( ENTROPYΔ  are expected to be 
negatively related to changes in excess value. We also consider an alternative measure of diversity 
proposed by Burch and Nanda (2003) (Eq. (4) in their paper). The metric, which they call CPOSTDIV , 
is equal to  
[ ] [ ]CSSCPP BMBMAbsWBMBMAbsW //)(//)( −+−    (12) 
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where PW )( SW  is the ratio of the post-spinoff parent firm’s (the spun-off unit’s) assets to the sum of the 
parent firm’s and the spun-off unit’s assets. PBM / )/( SBM  is the post-spinoff market to book ratio of 
the parent firm (spunoff unit). CBM /  is the combined firm’s market to book ratio, which is equal to the 
asset weighted average of PBM /  and SBM / . This metric measures the diversity that is eliminated as a 
result of the spinoff and is expected to be positively related to changes in excess value.  
Rajan et al. (2000) show that the excess value of a diversified firm is positively related to the 
inverse of equally weighted average Tobin’s Q over segments in the firm. Ahn and Denis (2004) show 
that the change in excess value surrounding spinoffs is positively related to the change in the inverse of 
the firm’s sales-weighted Q. Following Ahn and Denis (2004), we control for the change in the inverse of 
the firm’s sales-weighted average of segment Q )( INVQΔ . The segment Q is proxied by the median Q of 
single-segment firms operating at the same three-digit SIC level as the segment whenever there are at 
least five single-segment firms with available data, and at the two-digit SIC level or one-digit level as 
needed. Q is defined as the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets and is a 
good proxy for investment opportunities (Rajan et al, 2000). Our measure of a firm’s average Q is 
essentially the pure-play Q employed by Lang and Stulz (1994) but for the fact that in our computation of 
average Q we use the sales-weighted average, rather than the asset-weighted average. To the extent that 
the difference between a firm’s pure-play Q and its Q represents the industry-adjusted diversification 
discount (Lang and Stulz, 1994), the change in the pure-play Q should be negatively related to the change 
in excess value. Since we use the change in the inverse of the average Q )( INVQΔ , we expect INVQΔ  
to be positively related to the change in excess value. 
Following Denis et al. (2002) and Lins and Servaes (1999), we also control for the change in firm 
size )( SIZEΔ , measured as the change in the square root of the firm’s total assets, and the change in the 
firm’s investment levels )( CEXPSALEΔ , measured as the change in the firm’s ratio of capital 
expenditure to sales.  
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4. Data sources and descriptive statistics 
4.1. Data sources and requirements 
The sample is obtained from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database which identifies 
spinoffs from news articles. We first search the database for all spinoffs completed by firms listed on the 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq between 1981 and 2004. Spinoffs involving a Real Estate Investment Trust are 
excluded. This results in an initial sample of 527 spinoffs. We then impose the following data 
requirements in order for a spinoff to remain in our sample: 
1) We verify that the transaction is actually a spinoff by checking news articles in Factiva and Lexis-
Nexis. A precise announcement date and effective date for the spinoff must be available from either 
Factiva or Lexis-Nexis. 7 transactions are lost due to lack of an announcement date or effective date 
or both. Transactions involving tracking stock, equity carve-outs or distributions of common stock in 
other publicly traded firms that are not subsidiaries of the parent firm do not constitute spinoffs and 
are dropped, resulting in a loss of 39 transactions; 
2) The data must be available on the Compustat Annual Industrial database, the Compustat Business 
Segment Information database, the CRSP database or the IBES database for at least one full fiscal 
year before the spinoff announcement date for the parent firm and one full fiscal year following the 
spinoff effective date for both the remaining parent firm and the spunoff unit. Imposing the data 
availability criteria results in a reduction of 114 spinoffs; 
3) 118 spinoffs are excluded because they involve firms with segments operating in the financial 
industry (SIC 6000-6999); 
4) 20 spinoffs are removed because the spunoff unit was not a wholly owned subsidiary of the parent 
firm; 
5) 16 spinoffs are eliminated where the subsidiary was trading prior to the spinoff announcement date.  
6) 31 spinoffs that were taxable and 8 spinoffs involving ADRs are eliminated. 
7) Another 47 spinoffs are dropped because they were conducted by single-segment firms.  
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8) Finally, 1 spinoff is lost because the firm engaged in multiple spinoffs between the announcement and 
the effective date. 
The final sample consists of 126 separate spinoff events by 118 parent firms. Eight parent firms 
have two spinoffs separated by multiple years. 93 spinoffs have complete IBES data. Table 1 reports the 
frequency of spinoffs by announcement year. To control for firm-specific characteristics such as size and 
industry classification in the empirical tests, we select a matching firm for each parent firm in our sample. 
For each sample firm, we find a matching firm by searching through the list of all multi-segment firms 
with data available on the Compustat Annual Industrial database, the Compustat Business Segment 
Information database, the CRSP database, and the IBES database if the sample firm has complete IBES 
data. The matches exclude all parents and subsidiaries in the sample and must not have engaged in 
spinoffs between the pre-spinoff and the post-spinoff year of the sample firm. From this list of possible 
matches, we select the firm in the same two-digit SIC code and is closest in size to the sample firm 
(measured as the book value of total assets at the latest fiscal year-end prior to the spinoff announcement). 
To obtain a reasonable tradeoff between industry and size matching, we impose the condition that the size 
of the matching firm must be within 75% of the size of the sample firm. If no matches are found at the 
two-digit level, we search for a match at the one-digit level. In our sample, 117 firms have matching firms 
at the two-digit level and 9 firms at the one-digit level.  
 
4.2. Data description 
Panel A of Table 2 provides summary statistics of the sample firms. The pre-spinoff data are 
computed at the latest fiscal year-end prior to the spinoff announcement date. The post-spinoff data are 
measured at the end of the first full fiscal year following the spinoff effective date. The spinoff size 
numbers show that the average (median) subsidiary represents 25.9% (22.7%) of the post-spinoff 
combined firm’s assets. The parent firm’s assets and sales decrease significantly following the spinoff 
while the combined firm’s assets and sales increase significantly. The spinoffs result in the parent firm’s 
entropy measure decreasing from a pre-spinoff mean (median) of 0.751 (0.694) to a post-spinoff mean 
 19
(median) of 0.413 (0.311). The combined firm, however, experiences an average (median) increase of 
0.071 (0.039) in entropy. These changes are all statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level. Therefore, 
while there is some evidence that the combined firm becomes more diversified after the spinoffs, possibly 
due to internal growth or acquisitions, the bottom-line is that the parent firm becomes considerably more 
focused following the spinoff. The ratio of EBIT to sales of the combined firm declines following the 
spinoff, mainly due to a significant increase in the combined firm’s sales. No significant changes are 
observed in the combined firm’s ratio of capital expenditure to sales and the leverage ratio. 
Panel of B of Table 2 summarizes the differences in the financial characteristics between the 
sample and the matching firms before the announcement of the spinoff. On average, the sample and the 
matching firms are quite similar with respect to size, the level of diversification, profitability, investment 
rates, and the leverage ratio.  
 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1. Univariate analysis 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the differences in the information asymmetry variables between the 
sample and the matching firms prior to the announcement of the spinoff. If information asymmetry is an 
important motive for firms to engage in spinoffs, we should observe higher levels of information 
asymmetry for the sample firms than for the matching firms prior to the spinoff. The findings are 
consistent with our hypothesis. The mean (median) forecast error for the sample firms is 0.0130 (0.0024), 
which is more than two times that of the matching firms. The differences between the two groups are 
significant at the 0.1 level for the mean and at the 0.05 level for the median. The results are more 
pronounced for the other two measures of information asymmetry, for which the differences across the 
two groups are all significant at the 0.01 level.  
If the break up of a diversified firm into separate unites improves the accuracy of information 
processing about each unit’s profitability and operating efficiency, the level of information asymmetry 
should decrease following the break up. Panel B of Table 3 reports summary statistics of the information 
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asymmetry variables for the sample firms measured before and after the spinoff. Post-spinoff values are 
computed as if the spun-off unit was still a division within the parent firm. Overall, the measures of 
information asymmetry decrease slightly after the spinoff but only the median changes in the market-
adjust and the market-and-industry-adjusted residual standard deviation are significant at the 0.05 level. 
This contrasts with a slight increase in the level of information asymmetry for the matching firms during 
the same period as reported in Panel C of Table 3.  
Panel B of Table 3 also reports the excess value of the sample firms measured before and after the 
spinoff. Consistent with the diversification literature, we find that the parent firms trade at a substantial 
discount relative to their single segment peers prior to the spinoff. The mean (median) excess value of the 
parent firms is 1111.0− )1491.0(− prior to the spinoff. Both the mean and the median are significantly 
different from 0 at the 0.05 level. Following completion of the spinoff, the diversification discount is 
eliminated. The mean (median) excess value of the post-spinoff combined firms is 0061.0− )0152.0(− . 
Neither the mean nor the median is significantly different from 0. Moreover, the firm-by-firm change in 
excess value has a mean (median) of 0.1049 (0.1363). The mean and median changes are significant at the 
0.01 level. Therefore, on average, spinoffs lead to significant firm value improvements. These findings 
are consistent with the view that diversified firms are undervalued and the value is unlocked through 
divestitures. It should be noted that not all spinoffs result in an increase in the combined firm’s excess 
value. In fact, in 46 cases (36.51%), there is a decrease. In untabulated results, we find that the post-
spinoff parent firms trade at an insignificant average (medium) premium of 0253.0 (0.0182). The spun-
off units, however, have a significant negative mean (median) excess value of 1137.0− ).1738.0(−  This 
implies that the sample firms tend to divest low-valued subsidiaries. In Panel C of Table 3, we also report 
the pre- and the post-spinoff excess value for the matching firms. The matching firms are traded at a 
statistically insignificant average (median) discount of 0814.0− )0391.0(− in the pre-spinoff period. 
This is possibly the reason why these firms did not engage in spinoffs since firms divest only when they 
are undervalued by the market (Nanda and Narayanan, 1997). Nor do the matching firms experience an 
increase in firm value from the pre-spinoff to the post-spinoff period.  
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5.2. Simple correlation coefficients 
If information asymmetry results in undervaluation of the diversified firm, and if firms undertake 
spinoffs to reduce information asymmetry, then improvements in firm value surrounding a spinoff should 
be negatively related to changes in the level of information asymmetry. Panel A of Table 4 presents the 
Pearson correlation coefficients for changes in firm excess value and changes in the three measures of 
information asymmetry. Consistent with our hypothesis, changes in firm excess value are negatively 
correlated with changes in each information asymmetry variable at the 0.05 level of significance or better. 
Additionally, each of the pairwise correlations among the three information asymmetry variables is 
positive and significant at the 0.01 level.  
Panel B of Table 4 reports the correlations of changes in firm excess value with control variables 
and the correlations of the control variables with each other. Consistent with our predictions, changes in 
firm excess value are negatively correlated with the pre-spinoff parent excess value at the 0.01 level of 
significance, negatively correlated with changes in the combined firm’s entropy measure at the 0.05 level 
of significance, and positively correlated with changes in the inverse of Tobin’s Q at the 0.01 level of 
significance. With these three exceptions, changes in firm excess value are uncorrelated with the control 
variables. However, even though the control variables are individually insignificantly correlated with 
changes in firm excess value, they may be jointly significant in multiple regressions, to which we now 
turn4. 
 
5.3. Multivariate analysis 
In this section, we confirm our univariate results that relate the change in firm excess value and 
the change in the level of information asymmetry around spinoffs using multivariate regression analysis. 
The regression is of the form 
                                                 
4 We note that several pairwise correlations among the control variables are significant. For example, SIZEΔ is positively 
correlated with TAKED  and REGD  at the 0.05 and the 0.01 level, respectively. This highlights the need for our analysis to 
take into account the possible multicollinearity problems in multivariate regression analysis.  
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iEVΔ = iii ZIA εββα +•+Δ+ 21                                                 (13) 
where iEVΔ is the change in firm excess value, iIAΔ  is the change in the proxy of information 
asymmetry, and iZ is a list of control variables discussed previously. Table 5 presents the main results of 
this paper on whether the change in information asymmetry surrounding the spinoff is negatively related 
to the change in firm excess value. Information asymmetry is measured by the forecast error )( ERRΔ , the 
market-adjusted residual standard deviation ))(( MAεσΔ and the market-and-industry-adjusted residual 
standard deviation ))(( MIAεσΔ  in models (1) through (3) and models (4) through (6), respectively. 
Models (4) through (6) only include the control variables that are statistically significant at least at the 0.1 
level.  
The results show strong support for our principal hypothesis that the change in firm value is 
negatively related to the change in information asymmetry around spinoffs regardless of which measure 
of information asymmetry is employed. All three information asymmetry variables are significant with 
negative sign. When information asymmetry is measured by ERRΔ , the coefficient is 949.0−  and 
significant at the 0.01 level in model 1, and it is 972.0− and significant at the 0.01 level in model 3. 
When information asymmetry is proxied by MA)(εσΔ , the coefficient is 849.6− and significant at the 
0.05 level in model 2, and it is 759.6− and significant at the 0.05 level in model 5. When we measure 
information asymmetry by MIA)(εσΔ , the coefficient is 326.7− and significant at the 0.05 level in model 
3, and it is 269.7− and significant at the 0.05 level in model 6. We also compute the economic impact of 
the information asymmetry variables. We measure the economic impact of an information variable as the 
improvement in firm excess value when we decrease the variable by one standard deviation. Consider the 
standard deviation of MA)(εσΔ , which is 0.0099. The coefficient in model 2 on MA)(εσΔ  implies that 
when we decrease MA)(εσΔ  by one standard deviation EVΔ  increases by 0.0669. This increase 
represents approximately 64.6% of the average change in excess value for the sample. A similar exercise 
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using model 3 implies that a one standard deviation decrease in MIA)(εσΔ  results in an implied change in 
excess value of 0.0711, or approximately 67.7% of the average change in excess value for the sample.  
We now turn to a brief discussion of the control variables employed. In all six models we include 
the pre-spinoff parent excess value ),( preEV  the change in entropy ),( ENTROPYΔ and the change in the 
inverse of Tobin’s Q ),( INVQΔ  because, as the univariate analysis indicates, these variables are 
significantly correlated with the change in firm value surrounding spinoffs ).( EVΔ  Consistent with the 
univariate results, all regressions show that preEV is negatively and significantly related to EVΔ at the 
0.01 level of significance (t-statistics range from 245.6−  to ).056.5−  This implies that greater value 
improvements occur where they are more needed, that is, in firms that are trading at a larger discount. A 
one standard deviation decrease in preEV  increases EVΔ by 0.1711 to 0.1906. 
ENTROPYΔ is significantly negatively related to EVΔ at the 0.05 level in all six regressions (t-
statistics range from 593.2−  to ).288.2− This indicates that an increase in diversity reduces the value of 
the firm. A one standard deviation increase in diversity reduces the excess value of a firm by 0.0728 to 
0.0787. In unreported results, we try an alternative measure of diversity proposed by Burch and Nanda 
(2003) ).(CPOSTDIV  CPOSTDIV  has the expected positive sign but is not significant in any 
regression. INVQΔ  is significantly and positively related to EVΔ at the 0.01 level in all regressions (t-
statistics range from 115.4 to ).278.4  
To control for possible size effect, we also include the change in firm size )( SIZEΔ  in all six 
models. Berger and Ofek (1995) find that the excess value is significantly positively related to firm size. 
Consistent with their results, we find a positive relation between the change in excess value and the 
change in firm size. This variable is significant at the 0.05 level in models (1) and (4) and at the 0.1 level 
in the remaining models. In models (1) through (3), we control for the change in the ratio of capital 
expenditure to sales ).( CEXPSALEΔ This variable is not significant and the results are qualitatively 
unchanged whether we leave out CEXPSALEΔ . In untabulated results, we also add in the relative size 
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of the spinoff ),(SPINSIZE  the takeover dummy ),(TAKED  the regulation dummy ),(REGD  and the 
focus dummy ).(FOCUSD  These variables are correlated with one or more of the major control 
variables mentioned above. Hence, we do not include them in the main results. However, these variables 
are not significant as well.  
Overall, these findings are consistent with the conjecture that the improvement in firm value 
following the spinoff is negatively related to the change in the level of information asymmetry.  
 
5.4. Announcement returns and information asymmetry 
For completeness, we also examine abnormal returns around spinoff announcements and relate 
information asymmetry and abnormal returns using regression analysis. We compute cumulative 
abnormal returns from -1 to +1 days surrounding the announcement of spinoffs. The abnormal return is 
estimated using the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index return and the market model with 
parameters estimated over days -250 to -50 relative to the announcement date. The three-day 
announcement period abnormal returns have a mean of 3.87 % and a median of 3.16%. Both the mean 
and the median are significant at the 0.01 level. The magnitudes are similar to those reported in previous 
studies. For example, Desai and Jain (1999) report a three-day announcement period abnormal return of 
3.84%.  
We estimate various regression models of the announcement period abnormal returns on the level 
of information asymmetry prior to the spinoff or the change in the level of information asymmetry 
surrounding the spinoff. If information asymmetry results in undervaluation, then firms with higher levels 
of information asymmetry prior to the spinoff and firms with greater reductions in the level of information 
asymmetry surrounding the spinoff should exhibit higher abnormal returns upon the announcement. We 
find that the announcement period abnormal returns are positively related to the pre-spinoff level of 
information asymmetry and negatively related to the change in the level of information asymmetry around 
the spinoff as predicted. However, these relations are not statistically significant.  
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5.5. Robustness 
In Table 6 and 7, we report the results of a battery of sensitivity and robustness checks. First, to 
avoid potential problems with outliers, we perform robust MM regressions and re-estimate models (1) 
through (3). This yields results qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5. The three information 
asymmetry variables remain significant at the 0.05 level or better. In untabulated results we also try to 
winsorize all the variables we compute at the 5st and the 95th percentiles of their distributions and re-
estimate models (1) through (3). Once again the results are unaffected.  
Second, although the Breusch-Pagan test shows little evidence of heteroskedasticity, we employ 
the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimator (HC3) as a double-checking of our inferences 
since both MacKinnon and White (1985) and Long and Ervin (2000) recommend that it may be wise to 
use HC3 even in the absence of detected heteroskedasticity. Our inferences are unchanged. The 
significance level drops for ERRΔ  but this variable is still significant at the 0.05 level. The other two 
information asymmetry variables remain significant at the 0.05 level.  
Third, we consider an alternative construction of the forecast error variable. Instead of deflating 
the forecast error by the stock price, we use the raw forecast error. The pre-spinoff forecast error of the 
firm is modified as 
MEDpre FOREEARNACTEARNRAWERR −=       (14) 
qnd the post-spinoff forecast error of the firm as  
spunspunoffparentparentpost RAWERRwRAWERRwRAWCERR ** +=                        (15) 
where parentw )( spunoffw are defined as above, and parentRAWERR )( spunoffRAWERR  are measured as 
parentparentparent FOREEARNACTEARNRAWERR −=                             (16) 
spunoffspunoffspunoff FOREEARNACTEARNRAWERR −=                           (17) 
The change in the raw forecast error is defined as  
prepost RAWERRRAWCERRRAWERR −=Δ                                   (18) 
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In untabulated results we find that the raw forecast error drops from a pre-spinoff mean (median) 
of 0.1981 (0.0800) to a post-spinoff mean (median) of 0.1138 (0.0443). The mean and the median 
changes are significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. The regression results in Table 6 show that 
the change in the raw forecast error is negatively related to the change in excess value at the 0.1 level of 
significance.  
Fourth, we use the asset-based excess value measure instead of the sales-based excess value 
measure and re-estimate models (1) to (3). The pre-spinoff excess value is excluded since it is highly 
correlated with the information variables. Due to missing segment asset values, the sample size reduces to 
83 for the model that employs ERRΔ as the measure of information asymmetry and 126 for the two 
models that use MIA)(εσΔ  and MA)(εσΔ  as the proxies of information asymmetry. As shown in Table 6, 
the information variables still remain significant at the 0.05 level or better.  
Fifth, we exclude those cases in which the spinoff event was preceded by an equity carve-out and 
re-estimate models (1)-(3). This results in the exclusion of 15 observations. The results are largely 
unaffected. Due to space constraints, they are not reported.  
In the final robustness check, we consider an alternative construction of the regression model. 
Instead of estimating cross-sectional regressions, we estimate panel regressions which include firm fixed 
effects and year dummies. We estimate the following model for the pre-spinoff (year -1) and the post-
spinoff year (year +1):  
itEV = iti ttititi YearZIA ενβββ ∑ ++•++ *210                               (19) 
where itEV is the excess value of firm i in period t. itIA is the measure of information asymmetry of firm i 
in period t. itZ is a list of control variables. tYear is the year dummy variable. And i0β is the firm-specific 
intercept term which captures firm fixed effects. If information asymmetry results in undervaluation of 
the firm, we should observe a negative relation between the excess value and the measure of information 
asymmetry. The results in Table 7 are consistent with the conjecture. All three measures of information 
asymmetry are significantly and negatively related to the excess value at the 0.05 level or better.  
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In sum, our results survive a battery of robustness checks. We believe that we have presented 
persuasive evidence that improvements in firm value following spinoffs are associated with decreases in 
the level of information asymmetry.  
 
6. Conclusion 
A large number of studies document that diversified firms trade at a discount relative to 
specialized firms in the same industries and that increasing corporate focus lead to higher market 
valuations and stock returns. Yet, the interpretation of the diversification discount remains controversial. 
One group of literature explains the value discount and the divestiture decisions of diversified firms based 
on asymmetric information between the market and the firm’s management. This explanation draws 
theoretical support from the model of Nanda and Narayanan (1999). They claim that diversified firms 
may be undervalued due to unobservability of divisional cash flows to the market. Breaking up the firm 
into separate business components will make it easier for the market to value each component correctly. 
Hence, undervalued firms requiring external financing may resort to divestitures to raise capital at a fair 
price. The predictions from their model are 1) the pre-divestiture information asymmetry of the divesting 
firms should be higher compared to their non-divesting counterparts, 2) divestitures will reduce the level 
of information asymmetry and the valuation discount, and more importantly, 3) the change in firm value 
following the divestiture will be negatively related to the change in the level of information asymmetry. 
In this paper, we empirically examine these predictions using a sample of corporate spinoffs. Spinoffs 
provide a particularly useful setting for the purpose of our test due to separate availability of financial 
data for the post-spinoff parent firm and the spunoff unit. This allows us to combine the data of the parent 
firm and the spinoff following the divestiture as if the firm were still a conglomerate and measure 
aggregate changes in firm value and the level of information asymmetry.  
We find that, prior to the spinoff, the sample firms have significantly higher levels of information 
asymmetry than their industry- and size-matched counterparts. For the sample firms the level of 
information asymmetry decreases slightly after the completion of the spinoff while for the matching firms 
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the level of information asymmetry increases during the same period. We also find that the sample firms 
trade at a substantial discount prior to the spinoff. Following the spinoff, the valuation discount is 
eliminated. The matching firms, however, are not valued at a significant discount in the pre-spinoff period. 
Nor do they experience an increase in firm value from the pre-spinoff to the post-spinoff period. Most 
importantly, we find that the change in aggregate value surrounding the spinoff is significantly negatively 
related to the change in the level of information asymmetry. The results suggest that information 
asymmetry is at least partly responsible for the diversification discount. 
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Table 1 Distribution of Spinoffs 
Distribution of 126 spinoffs by year of announcement. Spinoffs are identified from the SDC Mergers and 
Acquisitions Database. The sample is restricted to those multi-segment firms with financial data on the Compustat 
Annual Industrial database, the Compustat Business Segment Information database, the CRSP database or the IBES 
database The sample excludes cases where the spinoff was taxable, involved ADRs, involved firms with segments 
operating in the financial industry (SIC 6000-6999), where the spunoff unit was not a wholly owned subsidiary of 
the parent firm, or where the spunoff unit was trading prior to the spinoff announcement date.  
 
Year    Number   Year   Number 
1981  0  1993  5 
1982  1  1994  4 
1983  2  1995  12 
1984  3  1996  8 
1985  7  1997  4 
1986  4  1998  6 
1987  8  1999  8 
1988  7  2000  14 
1989  3  2001  4 
1990  10  2002  4 
1991  2  2003  4 
1992  5  2004  1 
        Total   126 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Summary statistics of selected financial characteristics for a sample of 126 firms that completed spinoffs in the period 1981-2004 and for a 
sample of 126 size- and industry-based matching firms that did not engage in spinoffs. Pre-spinoff values are measured at the latest fiscal year-
end prior to the spinoff announcement date. Post-spinoff values are measured at the end of the first full fiscal year following the spinoff effective 
date. Post-spinoff combined values are computed as if the spun-off unit(s) was still a division within the parent firm. Spinoff size is the spun-off 
firm’s post-spinoff assets divided by the sum of the parent and spinoff assets. Entropy is measured as )/1(
1
i
n
i
i PLnP∑
=
, where iP  is the 
percentage of sales in segment i at the four–digit SIC level and the summation is over n four-digit industry segments where the firm operates. 
EBITSALE is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to sales. CEXPSALE is the ratio of capital expenditure to sales. Leverage ratio is 
defined as long-term debt divided by total assets. T-statistics for the change in mean and Z-statistics from the Wilcoxon signed ranks test for the 
change in median are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance of the test statistics at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for sample firms before and after spinoffs 
    Pre-spinoff   Post-spinoff   Changes 
Variables   Parent 
  
Parent Spinoff Combined 
  Parent      
  Post - Pre 
Combined  
Post - Pre 
Spinoff size Mean     0.259     
 Median    0.227     
Asset ($mil) Mean  4818.647  4445.118  5532.129  -373.529 713.482 
        (-2.176)** (3.980)*** 
 Median 2018.034  1932.500  2482.643  -80.723 194.359 
        (-3.331)*** (5.669)*** 
 Std.dev. 7263.855  7127.389  8358.281  1926.619 2012.225 
Sales ($mil) Mean  5066.647  4099.066  5541.066  -967.581 474.419 
        (-3.177)*** (2.209)** 
 Median 2216.740  1556.221  2454.503  -147.808 171.664 
        (-5.034)*** (4.717)*** 
 Std.dev. 7499.213  6021.819  8330.212  3419.089 2411.281 
Entropy Mean  0.751  0.413  0.823  -0.339 0.071 
        (-10.288)*** (2.574)** 
 Median 0.694  0.311  0.736  -0.297 0.039 
        (-7.913)*** (2.708)*** 
 Std.dev. 0.387  0.449  0.425  0.369 0.311 
EBITSALE Mean  0.090  0.065  0.066  -0.025 -0.024 
        (-1.481) (-2.116)** 
 Median 0.094  0.090  0.082  0.001 -0.002 
        (0.057) (-2.200)** 
 Std.dev. 0.124  0.183  0.125  0.193 0.127 
CEXPSALE Mean  0.073  0.094  0.079  0.021 0.006 
        (1.481) (0.628) 
 Median 0.053  0.046  0.079  -0.001 -0.002 
        (-0.366) (-1.111) 
 Std.dev. 0.070  0.194  0.146  0.161 0.115 
Leverage Mean  0.207  0.233  0.224  0.026 0.016 
        (1.773)* (1.332) 
 Median 0.189  0.203  0.211  0.007 0.006 
        (1.582) (1.232) 
  Std.dev. 0.131   0.197   0.165   0.162 0.137 
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Table 2 Continued 
Panel B: Summary statistics for sample and matching firms before spinoffs 
Variables   Sample firms   Matching firms   Difference 
Asset ($mil) Mean  4818.647  4531.594  287.050 
      (1.421) 
 Median 2018.034  1851.992  13.016 
      (2.139)** 
 Std.dev. 7263.855  7197.049  2267.622 
Sales ($mil) Mean  5066.647  4405.749  660.898 
      (1.790)* 
 Median 2216.740  1971.018  12.666 
      (1.260) 
 Std.dev. 7499.213  6627.181  4144.213 
Entropy Mean  0.751  0.703  0.049 
      (1.073) 
 Median 0.694  0.685  0.020 
      (1.021) 
 Std.dev. 0.387  0.416  0.509 
EBITSALE Mean  0.090  0.091  -0.000 
      (-0.010) 
 Median 0.094  0.093  -0.014 
      (1.175) 
 Std.dev. 0.124  0.183  0.212 
CEXPSALE Mean  0.073  0.088  -0.015 
      (-0.515) 
 Median 0.053  0.051  0.007 
      (1.813)* 
 Std.dev. 0.070  0.328  0.325 
Leverage Mean  0.207  0.197  0.010 
      (0.606) 
 Median 0.189  0.185  0.005 
      (-0.533) 
  Std.dev. 0.131   0.131   0.184 
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Table 3 Information asymmetry and firm excess value surrounding spinoffs 
Summary statistics of the information asymmetry variables and firm excess value for a sample of 126 firms that completed spinoffs in the period 
1981-2004 and for a sample of 126 size- and industry-based matching firms that did not engage in spinoffs. Pre-spinoff values are measured at 
the latest fiscal year-end prior to the spinoff announcement date. Post-spinoff values are measured at the end of the first full fiscal year following 
the spinoff effective date. Post-spinoff values are computed as if the spun-off unit(s) was still a division within the parent firm. ERR  is earnings 
forecast error. The pre-spinoff parent firm’s forecast error is the absolute difference between actual earnings and the median forecast deflated by 
the stock price five days before the earnings announcement date. The post-spinoff combined firm’s forecast error is the absolute value of the 
weighted average of the signed forecast errors of the parent firm and the spun-off unit, where the weights are the assets of the parent or the spun-
off unit relative to the sum of assets of the parent and the spun-off unit computed at the end of the first full fiscal year following the spinoff. 
MA)(εσ is the market-adjusted residual standard deviation and MIA)(εσ  is the market-and-industry-adjusted residual standard deviation. The 
pre-spinoff parent firm’s MA)(εσ ( MIA)(εσ ) is obtained by regressing daily firm returns on value-weighted market (market and industry) 
returns over the 250-day period ending 50 days prior to the spinoff announcement date and calculating the standard deviation of the regression 
residuals. The post-spinoff combined firm’s MA)(εσ ( MIA)(εσ ) is obtained by regressing weighted average returns of the parent firm and the 
spun-off unit over the 250-day period starting 50 days after the spinoff effective and calculating the standard deviation of the regression residuals. 
The weights are the respective total assets of the parent firm or the spunoff unit relative to the combined assets of the parent firm and the spunoff 
unit computed at the end of the first full fiscal year following the spinoff. EV is excess value and is measured as the log of the ratio of a firm’s 
value of total capital (the book value of debt plus the market value of common equity) to the sum of the imputed value of its segments as stand-
alone firms. T-statistics for the change in mean and Z-statistics from the Wilcoxon signed ranks test for the change in median are reported in 
parentheses. Sample sizes vary due to missing IBES data. *, ** and *** indicate significance of the test statistics at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.   
 
Panel A:. Level of pre-spinoff information asymmetry for sample and matching firms 
Variables Sample size   Sample firms   Matching firms   Difference 
ERR  93 Mean  0.0130  0.0054  0.0076 
       ( 1.840)* 
 93 Median 0.0024  0.0012  0.0004 
       (2.113)** 
 93 Std. dev. 0.0408  0.0130  0.0397 
MA)(εσ  126 Mean  0.0219  0.0190  0.0029 
       ( 3.087)*** 
 126 Median 0.0190  0.0160  0.0015 
       (3.252)*** 
 126 Std. dev. 0.0117  0.0090  0.0105 
MIA)(εσ  126 Mean  0.0215  0.0185  0.0031 
       ( 3.428)*** 
 126 Median 0.0189  0.0159  0.0021 
       (3.787)*** 
  126 Std. dev. 0.0114   0.0089   0.0101 
 
Panel B: Level of information asymmetry and excess value for sample firms before and after the spinoff 
     Pre-spinoff   Post-spinoff   Changes 
Variables Sample size   Parent   Combined   Combined Post - Pre 
ERR  93 Mean  0.0130  0.0138  0.0009 
       (0.156) 
 93 Median 0.0024  0.0018  -0.0001 
       (-0.033) 
 93 Std.dev. 0.0408  0.0361  0.0532 
MA)(εσ  126 Mean  0.0219  0.0209  -0.0010 
       (-1.081) 
 126 Median 0.0190  0.0177  -0.0016 
       (-2.003)** 
 126 Std.dev. 0.0117  0.0117  0.0099 
MIA)(εσ  126 Mean  0.0215  0.0206  -0.0009 
       ( -1.079) 
 126 Median 0.0189  0.0175  -0.0013 
       (-2.076)** 
 126 Std.dev. 0.0114   0.0116   0.0097 
EV  126 Mean  -0.1111  -0.0061  0.1049 
       ( 2.764)*** 
 126 Median -0.1491  -0.0152  0.1363 
       (2.950)*** 
 126 Std.dev. 0.5296  0.4821  0.4261 
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Table 3 Continued 
Panel C: Level of information asymmetry and excess value for matching firms before and after the spinoff 
          Changes 
Variables Sample size   Pre-spinoff   Post-spinoff   Post - Pre 
 93 Mean  0.0054  0.0179  0.0125 
       ( 2.014)** 
 93 Median 0.0012  0.0017  0.0002 
       (1.776)* 
 93 Std.dev. 0.0130  0.0614  0.0600 
MA)(εσ  126 Mean  0.0190  0.0206  0.0016 
       (1.748)* 
 126 Median 0.0160  0.0174  0.0008 
       (1.634) 
 126 Std.dev. 0.0090  0.0115  0.0101 
MIA)(εσ  126 Mean  0.0185  0.0199  0.0014 
       (1.592) 
 126 Median 0.0159  0.0161  0.0005 
       (1.323) 
 126 Std.dev. 0.0089   0.0116   0.0100 
EV  93 Mean  -0.0814  -0.0694  0.0121 
       (0.245) 
 93 Median -0.0391  -0.0564  0.0156 
       (0.189) 
 93 Std.dev. 0.6135  0.5300  0.5527 
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Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients of combined firm’s excess value change and information asymmetry change with each other and with control variables 
EVΔ is the change in excess value. For this and other metrics, pre-spinoff values are measured at the latest fiscal year-end prior to the spinoff announcement date. Post-spinoff values are measured at the end of the first full 
fiscal year following the spinoff effective date. Post-spinoff values are computed as if the spun-off unit was still a division within the parent firm. ERRΔ  is the change in the square root of the analysts’ forecast error. 
MA)(εσΔ ))(( MIAεσΔ is the change in the market-adjusted (market-and-industry-adjusted) residual standard deviation.TAKED  is an indicator variable and is set to 1 if either the parent or the spinoff is taken over or merged 
with other firms within three fiscal years following the spinoff. REGD  is a dummy variable and is set to 1 if either the parent or the subsidiary is in a regulated industry based on the two-digit SIC code (SIC 4800-4829, 
4910-4949). FOCUSD  is an indicator variable and is set to 1 if the two-digit SIC code of the parent firm is different from that of the spunoff unit. A firm is excluded if it spinoffs more than one subsidiary at one time and 
one subsidiary has the same two-digit SIC code as the parent while the other does not, resulting in a loss of two observations.
preEV is the parent pre-spinoff excess value. SPINSIZE is the spinoff firm’s post-spinoff assets 
divided by the sum of the parent and spinoff assets. ENTROPYΔ  is the change in the combined firm’s entropy measure. INVQΔ  is the change in the inverse of the firm’s sales-weighted average of segment Tobin’s Q. The 
segment Q is proxied by the median Q of single-segment firms operating at the same three-digit SIC level as the segment whenever there are at least five single-segment firms with available data, and at the two-digit SIC level 
or one-digit level as needed. Q is measured as the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets. SIZEΔ  is the change in the square root of the firm’s total assets. CEXPSALEΔ  is the change in the 
ratio of capital expenditure to sales. P-values are reported in parentheses. Sample sizes are included in brackets. Sample sizes vary due to missing IBES data. *, ** and *** indicate significance of the test statistics at the 0.1, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 EVΔ  ERRΔ  MA)(εσΔ  MIA)(εσΔ  TAKED  REGD  FOCUSD  SPINSIZE  preEV  ENTROPYΔ
 
INVQΔ  SIZEΔ  
Panel A:. Information asymmetry variables 
ERRΔ  -0.287            
 (0.005)***            
 [93]            
MA)(εσΔ  -0.222 0.320           
 (0.012)** (0.002)***           
 [126] [93]           
MIA)(εσΔ  -0.226 0.310 0.998          
 (0.011)** (0.002)*** (0.000)***          
 [126] [93] [126]          
Panel B: Control variables 
TAKED  0.040 0.040 -0.049 -0.052         
 (0.653) (0.703) (0.582) (0.564)         
 [126] [93] [126] [126]         
REGD  -0.031 -0.027 0.014 0.013 0.105        
 (0.731) (0.794) (0.878) (0.884) (0.241)        
 [126] [93] [126] [126] [126]        
FOCUSD  0.043 0.054 0.187 0.193 -0.083 0.141       
 (0.632) (0.611) (0.037)** (0.031)** (0.361) (0.117)       
 [124] [92] [124] [124] [124] [124]       
SPINSIZE  0.114 0.158 0.091 0.085 0.002 -0.017 -0.021      
 (0.204) (0.130) (0.311) (0.342) (0.979) (0.854) (0.818)      
 [126] [93] [126] [126] [126] [126] [124]      
preEV  -0.509 0.063 0.140 0.126 0.063 0.031 -0.040 -0.030     
 (0.000)*** (0.547) (0.117) (0.161) (0.482) (0.732) (0.659) (0.741)     
 [126] [93] [126] [126] [126] [126] [124] [126]     
ENTROPYΔ  -0.186 0.173 0.060 0.069 0.105 -0.041 0.005 -0.021 0.056    
 (0.037)** (0.098)* (0.504) (0.441) (0.241) (0.647) (0.959) (0.814) (0.535)    
 [126] [93] [126] [126] [126] [126] [124] [126] [126]    
INVQΔ  0.300 0.095 0.035 0.031 0.185 -0.007 -0.035 0.227 -0.066 0.081   
 (0.001)*** (0.363) (0.697) (0.731) (0.038)** (0.938) (0.703) (0.011)** (0.463) (0.367)   
 [126] [93] [126] [126] [126] [126] [124] [126] [126] [126]   
SIZEΔ  0.119 0.023 -0.024 -0.012 0.289 0.205 0.146 -0.134 -0.086 0.061 -0.118  
 (0.186) (0.829) (0.786) (0.894) (0.001)*** (0.021)** (0.106) (0.135) (0.338) (0.494) (0.188)  
 [126] [93] [126] [126] [126] [126] [124] [126] [126] [126] [126]  
CEXPSALEΔ  0.125 0.080 0.031 0.017 -0.011 0.054 -0.034 -0.041 -0.078 -0.044 0.113 0.011 
 (0.164) (0.444) (0.732) (0.851) (0.906) (0.548) (0.710) (0.650) (0.386) (0.625) (0.206) (0.899) 
 [126] [93] [126] [126] [126] [126] [124] [126] [126] [126] [126] [126] 
 
 40
Table 5 OLS regressions on the combined firm’s excess value change 
This table reports the results of regression equation (13) as given in the text. The dependent variable )( EVΔ is the change in the combined firm 
excess value. For this and other metrics, pre-spinoff values are measured at the latest fiscal year-end prior to the spinoff announcement date. Post-
spinoff values are measured at the end of the first full fiscal year following the spinoff effective date. ERRΔ  is the change in the square root of 
analysts’ forecast error. 
MA)(εσΔ  ))(( MIAεσΔ is the change in the market-adjusted (market-and-industry-adjusted) residual standard 
deviation.
preEV  is the parent pre-spinoff excess value. ENTROPYΔ  is the change in the combined firm’s entropy measure. INVQΔ  is the 
change in the inverse of the firm’s sales-weighted average of segment Tobin’s Q. The segment Q is proxied by the median Q of single-segment 
firms operating at the same three-digit SIC level as the segment whenever there are at least five single-segment firms with available data, and at 
the two-digit SIC level or one-digit level as needed. Q is measured as the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets. 
SIZEΔ  is the change in the square root of the firm’s total assets. CEXPSALEΔ  is the change in the ratio of capital expenditure to sales. T-
values are reported in parentheses. Sample sizes vary due to missing IBES data. *, ** and *** indicate significance of the test statistics at the 0.1, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.037 0.065 0.064 0.044 0.067 0.066 
 (0.987) (1.885)* (1.862)* (1.181) (1.932)* (1.907)* 
Information asymmetry variables 
ERRΔ  -0.949   -0.972   
 (-3.137)***   (-3.212)***   
MA)(εσΔ   -6.849   -6.759  
  (-2.211)**   (-2.188)**  
MIA)(εσΔ    -7.326   -7.269 
   (-2.336)**   (-2.324)** 
Control variables 
preEV  -0.325 -0.356 -0.357 -0.323 -0.359 -0.36 
 (-5.107)*** (-6.123)*** (-6.17)*** (-5.056)*** (-6.201)*** (-6.245)*** 
ENTROPYΔ  -0.234 -0.249 -0.247 -0.235 -0.253 -0.25 
 (-2.288)** (-2.546)** (-2.524)** (-2.295)** (-2.593)** (-2.569)** 
INVQΔ  0.927 0.848 0.848 0.893 0.865 0.864 
 (4.247)*** (4.156)*** (4.162)*** (4.115)*** (4.273)*** (4.278)*** 
SIZEΔ  0.008 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 
 (2.311)** (1.711)* (1.738)* (2.099)** (1.732)* (1.758)* 
CEXPSALEΔ  -0.954 0.191 0.184    
 (-1.196) (0.722) (0.695)    
Adjusted R2 0.403 0.375 0.378 0.400 0.378 0.381 
Sample size 93 126 126 93 126 126 
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Table 6 Robustness checks on regression models  
The dependent variable )( EVΔ is the change in the combined firm excess value. For this and other metrics, pre-spinoff values are measured at the latest fiscal year-end prior to the 
spinoff announcement date. Post-spinoff values are measured at the end of the first full fiscal year following the spinoff effective date. ERRΔ  is the change in the square root of the 
analysts’ forecast error. MA)(εσΔ  ))(( MIAεσΔ is the change in the market-adjusted (market-and-industry-adjusted) residual standard deviation. RAWERRΔ  is the change in the 
square root of the raw forecast error. 
preEV  is the parent pre-spinoff excess value. ENTROPYΔ  is the change in the combined firm’s entropy measure. INVQΔ  is the change in the 
inverse of the firm’s sales-weighted average of segment Tobin’s Q. The segment Q is proxied by the median Q of single-segment firms operating at the same three-digit SIC level as 
the segment whenever there are at least five single-segment firms with available data, and at the two-digit SIC level or one-digit level as needed. Q is measured as the market value 
of total assets divided by the book value of total assets. SIZEΔ  is the change in the square root of the firm’s total assets. CEXPSALEΔ  is the change in the ratio of capital 
expenditure to sales. Models 1-3 report estimates from robust MM regressions. Models 4-6 report heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of t-values. Models 7-8 use the change in 
the raw forecast error as the measure of information asymmetry. Models 9-11 use the asset-based excess value measure. Chi-square statistics (T-statistics) are reported in parentheses 
for models 1-3 (4-11). Sample sizes vary due to missing IBES data or missing Compustat segment asset data. *, ** and *** indicate significance of the test statistics at the 0.1, 0.05 
and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
  Robust MM Estimation   
Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
Estimator (HC3)   RAWERR   Asset-Based Excess Value 
Model 1 2 3   4 5 6   7 8   9 10 11 
Constant 0.038 0.061 0.060  0.037 0.065 0.064  0.058 0.016  0.140 0.131 0.131 
 (0.94) (3.43)* (3.32)*  (0.88) (1.76)* (1.73)*  (1.387) (0.39)  (3.568)*** (4.131)*** (4.120)*** 
ERRΔ  -0.812    -0.949       -0.721   
 (6.05)**    (-2.07)**       (-2.106)**   
MA)(εσΔ   -7.091    -6.849       -10.989  
  (5.98)**    (-2.37)**       (-3.407)***  
MIA)(εσΔ    -7.573    -7.326       -11.412 
   (6.71)***    (-2.49)**       (-3.476)*** 
RAWERRΔ          -0.249 -0.199     
         (-1.804)* (-1.71)*     
preEV  -0.231 -0.322 -0.322  -0.325 -0.356 -0.357   -0.333     
 (11.44)** (32.60)*** (33.19)***  (-3.53)*** (-5.37)*** (-5.44)***   (-5.03)***     
ENTROPYΔ  -0.131 -0.121 -0.120  -0.234 -0.249 -0.247   -0.251  -0.259 -0.230 -2.229 
 (1.43) (1.61) (1.59)  (-1.69)* (-2.14)** (-2.13)**   (-2.35)**  (-2.252)*** (-2.367)** (-2.351)** 
INVQΔ  0.868 0.628 0.621  0.927 0.848 0.848   0.883  1.009 1.024 1.030 
 (14.87)*** (10.23)*** (10.14)***  (3.88)*** (3.63)*** (3.63)***   (3.90)***  (3.875)*** (4.920)*** (4.956)*** 
SIZEΔ  0.008 0.005 0.005  0.008 0.006 0.006   0.008  -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (5.46)** (1.99) (2.08)  (1.97)* (1.61) (1.65)   (2.36)**  (-1.771)* (-2.190)** (-2.159)*** 
CEXPSALEΔ  -0.752 0.321 0.315  -0.954 0.191 0.184   -0.980  -0.374 -0.151 -0.164 
 (0.89) (1.82) (1.77)  (-1.35) (0.21) (0.20)   (-1.18)  (-0.442) (-0.632) (-0.689) 
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.275 0.277  0.403 0.375 0.378  0.024 0.357  0.229 0.264 0.267 
Sample size 93 126 126   93 126 126   93 93   83 116 116 
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Table 7 Panel regression estimation 
This table reports the results of regression equation (19) as given in the text. The dependent variable )(EV is the 
firm excess value. ERR  is the square root of the analysts’ forecast error. MA)(εσ  ))(( MIAεσ is the market-
adjusted (market-and-industry-adjusted) residual standard deviation. ENTROPY  is the entropy measure. INVQ  
is the inverse of the firm’s sales-weighted average of segment Tobin’s Q. The segment Q is proxied by the median Q 
of single-segment firms operating at the same three-digit SIC level as the segment whenever there are at least five 
single-segment firms with available data, and at the two-digit SIC level or one-digit level as needed. Q is measured 
as the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets. SIZE  is the square root of the firm’s 
total assets. The regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummy variables. Coefficients for firm dummies and 
year dummies are not reported. Heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of t-values (HC3) are reported in parentheses. 
Sample sizes vary due to missing IBES data.*, ** and *** indicate significance of the test statistics at the 0.1, 0.05 
and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.118 0.281 0.280 -0.999 -0.599 -0.610 
 (0.60) (1.28) (1.28) (-3.18)*** (-1.76)* (-1.81)* 
ERR  -1.055   -1.101   
 (-2.74)***   (-3.74)***   
MA)(εσ   -9.613   -9.410  
  (-3.31)***   (-3.82)***  
MIA)(εσ    -9.946   -9.687 
   (-3.42)***   (-3.85)*** 
ENTROPY     -0.214 -0.290 -0.287 
    (-1.90)* (-2.89)*** (-2.86)*** 
INVQ     1.013 0.975 0.973 
    (5.74)*** (5.56)*** (5.55)*** 
SIZE     0.010 0.008 0.008 
    (3.32)*** (3.00)*** (3.04)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.853 0.834 0.834 0.882 0.862 0.862 
Sample size 93 126 126 93 126 126 
 
 
 
 
 
